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ast year’s highly publicized
controversy over China’s





to the country’s quest for greater international
technological leadership and independence. As the
WAPI case illustrates, Chinese efforts to assert itself
technologically through an active standards-based
technology policy has the potential for creating
considerable conflict with its trading partners while
raising concern in the advanced industrialized
countries that China has embarked on a new tech-
nonationalist course. Although China ultimately
backed away from its insistence on the WAPI stan-
dard, many observers expect it will not end the
conflicts being generated by the country’s emerging
standards strategy.
Students of modern Chinese history should not
be surprised by evidence of technonationalism in its
approaches to modernization. The roots of tech-
nonationalism go back to the 19th century, becom-
ing especially pronounced after the People’s
Republic was established in 1949. Although China
relied heavily on the Soviet Union for science and
technology during the 1950s, the souring of that
relationship helped make legitimate the emphasis
placed on technological self-reliance in Mao
Zedong’s development ideology. China’s most dra-
matic technological achievements of the second half
of the 20th century—in nuclear weaponry and space
technology—were characterized by a high degree of
independent development and tend to support tech-
nonationalist instincts. In light of this history, the
surprise is not that we see today the manifestations
of technonationalism; it is more that over the past
25 years, China has been as willing as it has been to
sacrifice self-reliance and increase its dependence on
foreign technology.
This change of direction began with the intro-
duction of the open-door policy toward foreign sci-
ence and technology during the late 1970s. One
result was China sending thousands of students
abroad for advanced training, the acquisition of vast
amounts of foreign technology, the steady liberaliza-
tion of foreign investment (and technology transfer)
policies, surging foreign investment beginning in the
early 1990s, and ultimately entry into the World
Trade Organization in 2001. During the same
period, though, China also initiated extensive
reforms in its domestic R&D system. 
Over the past 25 years, then, we can see Chinese
technological development following two tracks:
One is characterized by heavy reliance on foreign
technology (increasingly associated with expanding
foreign direct investment); the other involves a sig-
nificant reconfiguration of domestic institutions for
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research community are debating how far to push the country’s strategy for
promoting technology standards at home and abroad.
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM April  2005/Vol. 48, No. 4 35
36 April  2005/Vol. 48, No. 4 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM
high-priority focused national research and develop-
ment programs, and in the past 10 years significant
increases in spending on research and education.
Reflecting both strong traditions of self-reliant
technonationalism and the new interest in
technoglobalism so apparent in the post-Mao era,
both tracks have contributed to the enhancement of
Chinese technological capabilities. While often
mutually reinforcing, the two approaches are also
not without contradictions. Chinese manufacturers
(the technology users) often prefer performance
characteristics associated with imported technology.
Members of the Chinese research community (the
domestic technology producers), on the other hand,
often feel this preference for foreign technology
frustrates development of a national innovation sys-
tem. Meanwhile, China’s entry into the WTO has
created new conditions for both exacerbating and
resolving these tensions.
By facilitating increased foreign penetration of
the Chinese industrial economy, WTO membership
has created considerably more competition for Chi-
nese enterprises. Increased foreign investment has
led to perceptions among many Chinese executives,
government ministers, and scientists that the coun-
try is becoming excessively dependent on foreign
technology, a dependence that threatens national
security and undermines the gains Chinese industry
would otherwise be able to realize from participa-
tion in the global economy. For instance, in a num-
ber of product lines in different industries,
including consumer electronics, Chinese firms work
with only the slimmest of profit margins, while the
global technological leaders—with their control of
intellectual property, standards, and technological
architecture more generally—earn attractive rents
from technology licensing.
Such concern is being expressed at a time when
the effort to rebuild and reform the indigenous edu-
cational and research systems are beginning to show
results. It is not surprising, therefore, that China’s
technology policy leaders are calling for more
domestically developed Chinese technology in Chi-
nese products; that Chinese innovators are being
asked to be more aggressive in defining and claim-
ing intellectual property rights; and that the devel-
opment of indigenous Chinese standards is to be
encouraged in the context of reforming and reorga-
nizing the country’s standards regime. Hence, we see
a series of new initiatives for standards setting as
part of a new national standards strategy. While
these developments could be taken as a sign of a
troubling new technonationalism, such an interpre-
tation, without qualification, could lead to unneces-
sary misunderstandings of the complex mix of forces
at play.
The effective implementation of a national stan-
dards strategy in China will be affected by a number
of factors. First, the motivations for developing dis-
tinctive Chinese standards vary considerably.
National information security considerations figure
prominently in some standards-setting initiatives. In
others, royalties, profits, and relative gains are the
drivers. In some cases, developing standards that are
more culturally compatible may be an issue. More
generally, a sense of growing technological capabili-
ties and market power for standards setting—espe-
cially in the context of technonationalism—may be
at work. However, as we look at WAPI and other
cases, it is clear that interpretations of technonation-
alism themselves vary considerably within China.
While some parties might see national and local
interests served by having a strong national standards
strategy, many others—who have benefitted from
international standards—could be disadvantaged by
such a strategy.
Viewpoint
China’s standards strategy, in short, must accommodate a 
considerable heterogeneity of interests.
We should not assume that there is a true consis-
tency of objectives about standards in China. If any-
thing, collective preference formation is becoming a
more complex problem as the technical, industrial,
and government regulatory communities become
more differentiated as a result of economic changes
and new government-industry relationships. Thus,
when looking at the sources of initiative for new
standards, we see the consequences of years of reform
and organizational change. While government min-
istries (whose interests are not always identical or
even very compatible) still play prominent roles,
Chinese companies (with a variety of ownership
arrangements and relationships with the state), newly
established industrial associations, research institutes,
and universities have also become important actors.
Initiatives from one or more of these groups are not
necessarily welcomed by—or compatible with the
interests of—others. China’s standards strategy, in
short, must accommodate a considerable heterogene-
ity of interests.
The prospects for its success, especially with refer-
ence to the availability of the necessary resources,
must also be assessed. Proponents of a vigorous strat-
egy normally call attention to two resources of par-
ticular relevance: One is the growing technological
capability noted earlier; in this view, an aggressive
standards strategy should be pursued because China
believes it has the technological capability to set
technically advanced standards. The other is market
size; with such a large and growing market, the argu-
ment goes, standards set for and by China will
become standards internationally as well. 
The efficacy of both factors, however, has been
questioned. Some observers have argued, for
instance, that appeals to the Chinese market, rather
than leading to standards that will be accepted inter-
nationally, might actually result in a more parochial
standards arrangement that would put China at a
disadvantage. As for the question of technological
capabilities, most examples of China’s standards-
setting initiatives are clear evidence of the work of an
increasingly capable technical community. At the
same time, they also show that standards-develop-
ment efforts involve and can often depend on
important contributions from foreign partners. 
Foreign involvement points to both the existence
of limitations on Chinese technological capabilities
and the need for ongoing ties with technology lead-
ers, as well as to the fact that international collabora-
tion is increasingly important in the development of
new technologies. China’s standards strategy must
deal with this manifestation of technoglobalism, sug-
gesting that, in time, Chinese efforts to develop
indigenous standards will be far more accommodat-
ing to non-Chinese interests than the WAPI case ini-
tially suggested. Foreign governments and
corporations, as seen also in the WAPI case, are
increasingly mobilized to see that they are.
There can be little doubt that China’s market size,
increasing technological capabilities, cultural prefer-
ences, and sense of growing international importance
do indeed ensure that the country will become an
increasingly active promoter of technical standards.
But, as noted here, it would be a mistake to assume
that its approach to a standards strategy is mono-
lithic or that it is insensitive to non-Chinese inter-
ests. Instead, we should recognize that the world’s
engagement with China on standards issues is quite
feasible, and that successful engagement will proceed
with due recognition of the diversity of interests at
play within the country. 
This is not to deny that the interest in standards
setting is serious or that it is unrelated to the deep
strains of technonationalism in China; the Chinese
government remains committed to the promotion of
Chinese standards through its R&D spending and
regulatory policies. But, for China’s foreign commer-
cial and governmental interlocutors, it is important
to recognize that the country’s transition from social-
ism toward a market economy has generated increas-
ingly complex and diverse economic interests, and
the globalization of research and innovation works in
favor of moving that transition toward acceptance of
a more interdependent technoglobalism.
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